New HIPAA Rule Scheduled for Publication Today: OK, it's not the new Security Rule revisions we've been expecting, and despite early proclamations that this is a "massive overhaul," it's really not that big a deal, as best I can tell.*
* Here's the caveat: I haven't read the whole thing; I hope to do so over the weekend. But in the meantime, here's my first-blush impression of it (coming soon to a law firm website):
HHS Finalizes
Long-Awaited HIPAA Privacy Rule: Faster Access, Easier Care Coordination, and a
Firm July 2027 Deadline
On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) announced a final rule titled
"HIPAA Privacy Rule: Changes to Support Coordinated Care and Individual
Engagement and Reduce Regulatory Burdens" (RIN 0945-AA00). The final rule
completes a rulemaking process that began with OCR's January 2021 proposal and
adopts much of that proposal, with several notable modifications and omissions
discussed below. The 363-page final rule was posted by OCR for public
inspection on November 16 (Federal Register Document No. 2026-23429) and is
scheduled for publication in the Federal Register on November 19, 2026.
Despite almost six years of anticipation, the final rule is
an incremental adjustment rather than an overhaul. Many of the changes relieve
covered entities of existing obligations or confirm flexibility they already
had, and most of the new requirements will be familiar or easy to meet.
Organizations that already comply with stricter state access laws or federal
interoperability requirements may need to change relatively little. However,
the rule is not merely a paperwork exercise, as cutting by half the medical
records access response period , requiring free electronic access to records in
certain circumstances, and requiring posted fee schedules will require changes
to information release workflows, vendor contracts, and pricing. Also, a covered entity will need to update
its Notice of Privacy Practices, review its fee practices and access
procedures, and review its business associate agreements (especially with
information release vendors) before the compliance date.
•
Federal Register publication: scheduled for November
19, 2026.
•
Effective date: 60 days after publication (January 18,
2027, assuming publication as scheduled).
•
General compliance date: 180 days after the effective
date, or 240 days after publication (July 17, 2027, assuming publication as
scheduled).
•
Business associate agreements: an extended transition
period applies to qualifying existing agreements that must be modified.
Most of the changes concern the individual right of access
under 45 C.F.R. § 164.524, an area that has been a regulatory focus of OCR for
some time.
•
15-day response deadline. Covered entities must
act on access requests as soon as practicable and no later than 15 calendar
days after receipt, cutting the current 30-day period in half. OCR describes 15
days as an outer limit, particularly for electronic copies. For many providers
this changes little: Texas, for example, already requires covered entities using
electronic health records to furnish electronic copies within 15 business days
of a written request (Tex. Health & Safety Code § 181.102), and other state
laws and CMS interoperability requirements impose similar or shorter timelines.
It’s worth noting that Texas entities calibrated to the state deadline will
still need to tighten their processes to meet the shorter 15 calendar day
deadline, and the federal deadline applies to paper records and oral requests
as well. A single extension of up to 30
calendar days remains available with written notice to the individual within
the initial 15-day period. Where another federal or state law requires a
shorter timeframe, that shorter period is deemed practicable. Discussions with
the individual seeking access about the scope or format of a request do not
stop the clock. In addition, Business
Associate Agreements should be modified to incorporate these tighter timelines
for business associates to provide access to records.
•
No unreasonable barriers. Regulated entities may
not impose measures that impede access when a less burdensome method is
practicable, and the rule limits identity verification requirements that
unreasonably burden individuals exercising their access rights. These changes are in line with the 21st
Century Cures Act, which separately prohibits health care providers, health IT
developers, and health information networks from practices likely to interfere
with access to electronic health information unless an exception applies. Conduct that violates HIPAA access rules may
therefore also create information blocking exposure.
•
Personal health applications. The rule adds new
definitions of "electronic health record" and "personal health
application" or “personal health app” and establishes that the right of
access includes obtaining an electronic copy of PHI through a personal health
app when the covered entity can produce it in that form and format. Formats
required by other laws, such as standardized APIs, are deemed readily
producible. App developers selected by the individual are not business
associates, and a covered entity may not deny access to the individual's chosen
app based on concerns about how the app will handle the data after receipt. OCR
distinguishes apps managed primarily for an organization other than the
individual, such as a clinical-trial app run for the trial sponsor, which fall
outside the definition of a personal health app.
•
Directing ePHI to third parties. Consistent with
Ciox Health, LLC v. Azar, the right to direct transmission to a
designated person is limited to electronic copies of PHI in an electronic
health record that is part of the designated record set. "Electronic
health record" is defined broadly to include clinical and billing data
maintained by direct and indirect treatment providers such as laboratories and
radiology practices. Requests must be clear, conspicuous, and specific, and
covered entities may require them in writing. Requests that fall outside this
right, such as a request that paper records be sent to an attorney, should be
handled as disclosures under a valid HIPAA authorization, where the
right-of-access fee limits and timelines do not apply.
•
Fees and transparency. The rule specifies when
electronic PHI must be provided free of charge, including access through a
personal health app and in-person inspection, and requires advance notice of
fees. Covered entities must post estimated fee schedules on their websites for
copies provided under the right of access and under valid authorizations. Because
the posting requirement extends to authorization-based requests, entities that
rely on release-of-information vendors should confirm that vendor pricing is
captured in the posted schedule and that vendor contracts are consistent with
the new fee limits.
•
Summaries. When offering a summary in lieu of
the full record, covered entities must inform individuals that they retain the
right to a complete copy.
The rule amends the definition of "health care
operations" to clarify that health plans may use and disclose PHI for both
population-based and individual-level care coordination and case management. It
also expressly permits covered entities to disclose PHI for individual-level
care coordination and case management to social services agencies,
community-based organizations, home and community-based services (HCBS)
providers, and similar third parties that provide health-related services. This
should ease closed-loop referral programs addressing housing, nutrition, transportation,
and other social needs. The permission has limits. Disclosures must still fit
within treatment or health care operations, and OCR did not finalize the
proposed exception to the minimum necessary standard for individual-level care
coordination, so minimum necessary continues to apply to non-treatment
disclosures. Whether a community partner needs a business associate agreement
depends on the services it performs for the covered entity, not merely on its
receipt of PHI. Also, the permission does not override 42 C.F.R. Part 2 or
state laws requiring consent for sensitive information (for example, in Texas,
mental health and certain other records carry heightened consent requirements),
so layered consent analysis remains necessary.
Direct treatment providers will no longer be required to
make a good-faith effort to obtain a written acknowledgment of receipt of the
Notice of Privacy Practices (NoPP), although the notice must still be provided.
NoPP content requirements are revised to better explain individual rights and
how to exercise them, including available methods of obtaining PHI and
associated fees, and a new right to discuss the notice with a designated
contact person or office. The rule also removes the exception that excluded
inmates of correctional institutions from receiving an NoPP. Most covered entities
should expect to revise and redistribute its NoPP before the compliance date. Entities
should coordinate this revision with other recent NoPP changes. Before eliminating acknowledgment forms,
providers should also confirm that no state law, payer contract, or
accreditation standard independently requires them.
•
Regulated entities may disclose PHI to
Telecommunications Relay Services (TRS) communications assistants for
individuals and workforce members who are deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind,
or who have a speech disability, and TRS providers are excluded from the
definition of business associate.
•
The command-authority permission for mission readiness,
previously limited to the Armed Forces, is expanded to all Uniformed Services,
including the U.S. Public Health Service and NOAA Commissioned Corps.
The rule does not finalize the January 2025 proposed
overhaul of the HIPAA Security Rule. That rulemaking (RIN 0945-AA22) has been
moved to long-term actions, with final action now targeted for July 2027, and
the current Security Rule remains in force. Covered entities and business
associates should continue to prioritize risk analysis and risk management,
which remain the most common findings in OCR Security Rule enforcement. The
2026 Unified Agenda also listed a separate proposed rule on access response
times (RIN 0945-AA28); clients should monitor whether OCR proceeds with that
rulemaking in light of the 15-day deadline adopted here.
The 2021 proposal considered changing the "serious and
imminent threat" standard for disclosures without authorization under 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(j) to a “serious and reasonably foreseeable” standard, and
considered changing the “exercise of professional judgment” standard with a
“good faith belief” standard for disclosures to family members of an individual
suffering from a substance use disorder or serious mental illness. However, OCR ultimately decided not to
implement these changes.
1.
Confirm that access workflows and
release-of-information vendors can meet the 15-calendar day access deadline
(entities calibrated to Texas’s 15-business day standard will need to tighten
timelines), and simplify identity-verification procedures.
2.
Inventory API and patient-portal capabilities and adopt
a policy for personal health app requests that does not deny access based on
downstream app practices.
3.
Review fee practices, including information-release
vendor pricing, identify mandatory no-charge scenarios, and prepare a website
fee schedule for the provision of medical records.
4.
Revise the Notice of Privacy Practices, designate a
contact person or office, and retire acknowledgment-of-receipt processes.
5.
Evaluate care-coordination programs with community
organizations against Part 2 and state law consent requirements if the entity
deals with substance use records or other records with heightened privacy
requirements.
6.
Identify business associate agreements that require
amendment and calendar the transition deadline.
7.
Update policies and procedures and train workforce
members before July 17, 2027 and document the training.
Labcorp Settles With State AGs: Labcorp agreed to pay $2.3 million to 44 different state AGs to settle a data breach by its debt collection vendor. The state AGs alleged HIPAA violations; prior to the HITECH Act, only the OIG could issue HIPAA fines, but state AGs now have enforcement authority as well. Labcorp previously agreed to a $35 million settlement of class action lawsuits brought directly by victims of the breach.
ONC Streamlines EHR Certification Requirements: The Office of the National Coordinator for Healthcare Information Technology has issued new rules streamlining the process by which electronic health record systems are certified as being compliant. I haven't read the rules yet, but ONC feels that the new rules will save the health industry billions in compliance costs.
On the other hand, the companion rules on data blocking have not been fully addressed yet. So there's more wood to chop for ONC.
OCR Settles Its 56th "Right of Access" Case: This time it's a Pennsylvania dental practice, Linda L. Shen d/b/a Shen Smiles, PC. The practice paid $140,000 to settle the case regarding its failure to provide a patient with his/her records, which apparently had been stolen by a former employee.
Copy of the resolution agreement here.
HIPAA at 30. A video message from OCR.
Some thought on the HIPAA impact of using AI tools. The key on the HIPAA side is dependent on whether the AI loop is open (learning or training) or closed (private or proprietary). On the non-HIPAA side, the issues are human-in-the-loop, accountability, and auditability.
OCR Ransomware Settlement #21: OCR recently entered into a settlement agreement with OSF Health System in Illinois and Michigan regarding a ransomware event that affected 54,000 patients. OCR fined the entity $500,000, and OCR will specially monitor OSF for 2 years to ensure HIPAA compliance.
Guess what the primary HIPAA failure of OSF was? As usual, the lack of a sufficient security risk analysis is the leading charge, along with the failure to provide timely notice to affected individuals or OCR.
Security Rule Update Delayed: The likely effective date of the proposed revisions to the HIPAA Security Rule to increase encryption, MFA, and other security safeguard requirements has been pushed back. The Notice of Proposed Rule Making was published January 2025, and HHS had indicated that it would likely be announced as final (possibly with some tweaks) in May 2026. I was always doubtful of that, and now HHS has announced that the rule will likely be finalized in one year's time.
Note that many providers and other covered entities objected to the new rules, which will certainly add costs and burdens to them. However, given the high level of cyber threats against the healthcare industry, I would be surprised if we did not eventually see some tightening of the screws, by increased enforcement if not by changes in the rules.
If you're in San Antonio today, come by the Convention Center at 10 am and hear Cheryl Camin Murray and me talk all about it.
AI Usage Generally Requires a BAA: If you are a covered entity and you use any AI product, keep one thing in mind: if that AI product touches any patient information, you better have a BAA in place with the AI vendor.
A business associate relationship exist whenever the BA provides a service to or for a covered entity and PHI is involved (used, disclosed, exchanged, etc.). Many healthcare AI programs involve a covered entity entering PHI into the system and receiving some output (clinical recommendations, encounter notes, medical record entries, etc.). In most commercial AI products (and any free ones, such as ChatGPT), the AI provider takes the "ingested" information and uses it for the AI system to further learn and refine its product. That taking and using potentially exposes the ingested information to further uses or disclosures by the AI provider.
If you are using an AI product, you need to keep in mind two things: does the data include PHI, and is the AI system "learning" from your data. If the answer to the first question is yes, then you need a BAA.
The second question adds some nuance: if the system is learning, then the data could potentially be used or exposed elsewhere. It is hard to understand how that type of "disclosure" would be permitted under HJIPAA at all. Disclosing to a business associate so it can help the covered entity with its business operations is OK; disclosing to the business associate so the business associate can improve its business is a little trickier.
Something to keep in mind.
It happens to everyone, even lawyers: The biglaw firm Blank Rome was hit with a couple of class action lawsuits over a May data breach in which 57,000 individuals' data was exposed. Apparently an attorney was duped into uploading files that contained the information. While this breach does not implicate HIPAA, in some ways it's worse because law firms often have some pretty valuable sensitive data. Some "deal" firms are targeted not for personal data, but for data on the companies they are representing in mergers and acquisitions; a data thief might have insider trading information if they know one company is about to buy a second one. Law firms should have robust phish testing and must take other security steps to protect the sensitive data they hold.
Law Firm Data Breaches Surge: While few of these are specifically HIPAA related (law firms can be business associates of covered entities, but that's not a relevant issue here), it is interesting to see how law firms are a hot new target for hackers. Like healthcare entities, law firms have access to confidential and highly sensitive information; some attacks target business and deal information, where the hackers are trying to get a jump ahead of stock price changes involving the firm's clients (or to otherwise get actionable data on the clients), while others seek to gain information that the hackers can use to extort a ransom payment from the firm.
Also like healthcare entities, some small law firms think they are safe because of their small size, whereas the opposite is usually true: small firms are less likely to have robust defenses, which make them easier to victimize.
You already knew this, but the healthcare sector is still the industry most targeted for cybersecurity incidents. Large amounts of data, good/useful data for hackers, a disjointed industry, and lots of small players with poor cybersecurity protections makes it such a big target.
Epic Ramps Up the Fight: It appears that Epic is not happy simply rousing up some of its customers to sue Health Gorilla regarding potential improper access to PHI through the CareQuality interoperability framework, part of Epic's Health Information Exchange structure, it seems that they are moving forward on multiple fronts. Background here. A few days ago, it was announced that they reached a settlement with GuardDog Telehealth, one of Health Gorilla's co-defendants, which apparently included an admission by GuardDog that they did, in fact, take PHI and provide it to trial lawyers looking for plaintiffs. This will bolster Epic's claims against Health Gorilla.
Now, it looks like Epic has reported to UPMC that it believes UPMC's system has suffered a HIPAA-reportable data breach, as part of the same pattern of access by Health Gorilla. This leverages UPMC to report the breach to potentially affected individuals, which will bring OCR into the mix as another entity looking at Health Gorilla's activities.
This will be interesting to watch. Epic does not have a reputation for playing nice.
If you ARE a Part 2 entity, try this instead:
Substance Use Disorder Treatment Records. The Practice is a substance use disorder treatment facility subject to 42 CFR Part 2. The Practice shall not use or disclose your information except in strict accordance with the provisions of 42 CFR Part 2. Specifically, the Practice shall not use or disclose such records in civil, criminal, administrative, or legislative proceedings against you except with your consent or pursuant to a court order accompanied by a subpoena or other legal requirement requiring us to disclose such information in such circumstances. Please contact the Practice if you have any questions regarding your rights to medical record confidentiality under 42 CFR Part 2.
Don't forget, unless you're paying me, I'm not your lawyer, so please check with your legal counsel if this language is appropriate for you.
OCR Chief Paula Stannard:
My friend and reporter Theresa Defino recently interviewed Paula Stannard, the (new-ish) current Director of HHS' Office for Civil Rights, the HIPAA enforcement agency. This is Paula's third stint at OCR. The interview is available here.
Why do you want to hear what Paula Stannard has to say?
OCR directors are political appointees who change with administrations. As such, CEs and BAs typically like to get to know the OCR director’s goals, priorities and perhaps special interests to align their compliance programs, better safeguard patients’ privacy and avoid enforcement actions.
Check it out.
Check out OCR's January 2026 Cybersecurity Newsletter. A link is here.
The tips focus on system hardening, but most of the recommendations are just common sense.
"Part 2" Providers: Don't Forget to Update Your NoPPs by February 16. Are you a "Part 2" provider? If you don't know, you probably aren't. "Part 2" refers to 42 CFR Part 2, which is the provision of the Code of Federal Regulations adding specifics to the general confidentiality provisions of 42 USC 290dd-2, requiring hightened confidentiality for the medical records of people seeing substance abuse treatment. Initially enacted as a part of 1970's Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, the law was meant to address the concern that people with drug abuse problems would not seek help out of fear that their treatment information would be used against them by law enforcement. The statute's provisions are very general; hence the regulations seek to flesh them out. The Part 2 rules existed before HIPAA, and are a sort of "super-HIPAA" level of protection for those particularly-sensitive medical records.
The regulations did not change over the years, while changes in the way medical records are kept, transferred, and used have changed dramatically, so HHS recently has made changes. The regulations only apply to federally funded or supported substance use disorder providers. Most of them know who they are.
And if you are one, be aware that you need to add some specific references to those Part 2 rules into your NoPP. If it doesn't already say so, your NoPP should specifically say that you are subject Part 2. Additionally, in the NoPP descriptions of (i) permitted disclosures for treatment, payment, and healthcare operations, and (ii) disclosures for which authorization is not required, you should add language indicating that the PHI you disclose imay not be used in legal proceedings against the patient except with consent or a court order. Finally, Part 2 organizations that intend to use PHI for fundraising must give patients the clear opportunity to opt out of such fundraising.
Finally, if the Part 2 provider is involved in a Organized Health Care Arrangement, the OHCA's NoPP must contain the provisions required to be included in the Part 2 provider's NoPP.
The Evolving Threat of Ransomware in Healthcare: Attackers are getting faster, and ransomware software is getting trickier and cheaper, but healthcare organizations are getting better at stopping attacks before encryption occurs. However, attackers are shifting their focus toward an extortion-only model: they don't encrypt your data, but they do access and copy PHI and threaten to release it unless the demand is paid.
Healthcare organizations still need to step up their game and keep defenses high. Encryption in motion and at rest is still the best cure, as is training and perimeter testing.
It's not just healthcare providers who suffer data breaches: I've been keeping up a stack of law firm data breaches, meaning to write a post on them. But I've decided there's really not much to say, other than to note that a data breach can happen to anyone, and anyone who suffers a breach runs a decent likelihood to get sued by any individuals who might plausibly have been damaged by the breach in one way or another.
This is far from an exhaustive list, but it's a start:
The big boys: Kirkland & Ellis, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Jones Day, Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks, and Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner
Adamson Ahdoot (CA)
Wacks Law Group (NJ)
Hill Farrer (CA)
Daniels Group (CO)
Cohen Cleary (MA)
Kelley Drye (NY)
Eckert Seamans (PA)
Riley Pope & Laney (SC)
Healthcare wins again: Once again, the healthcare industry was the most affected industry when it came to data breaches in 2024. Many reasons: the amount of personal information; the sensitivity, utility, and value of the information; the many different financial crimes that the information can help (identity theft, insurance fraud, ransom); the large and varied number of data-holders, threat vectors, and levels of IT sophistication; the varied levels of security and protection; etc.
Hat tip: Wade Emmert.
(Should've posted this earlier, sorry!)
HHS' OCR, Asst. Secretary for Health Policy Release Latest Version of Security Risk Analysis Tool: If you've followed HIPAA much, you are aware that Security Rule compliance has always lagged Privacy Rule compliance. At least part of this is because Privacy Rule requirements are much more of a one-size-fits-all regime, whereas Security Rule compliance requires a lot of individual customization. It's easier to just do what you are told ("give everybody a NoPP") versus having to decide what to do ("consider the risks associated with failure to properly warn patients about potential data uses and provide appropriate advice and guidance to them").
To assist HIPAA covered entities and business associates, OCR, NIST, and ONCHIT combined to produce a very useful (but somewhat cumbersome) "security risk analysis tool" that covered entities can use to conduct a risk analysis, determine what their HIPAA and other data security risks are, and craft safeguards that are appropriate for their operations. You can't know what you need to fix or protect unless you've done a risk analysis, and this is a good starting point if you don't have any other idea where to start.
Failure to conduct an appropriate security risk analysis is one of the most common, if not THE most common, cited area of failure when OCR issues a fine for a HIPAA violation. Additionally, last year OCR announced a specific new effort, similar to its enforcement focus on patients' right to access, to target covered entities and business associates that failed to conduct a proper risk analysis.
OCR has now issued an updated tool, version 3.6, which is available here.
OCR Named Enforcement Agency for Part 2: When HIPAA was first passed, the Privacy Rule was to be enforced by the Office for Civil Rights within HHS, and the rest of HIPAA was to be enforced by CMS. I'm not sure why that bifurcation happened, but a few years later HHS decided that OCR should be the enforcement agency for all of HIPAA.
Yesterday, HHS announced that OCR is now the enforcement agency for the federal privacy rules relating to substance abuse treatment facilities. Known in the industry as "Part 2" (because the rules are in Part 2 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations), it's basically a set of "super-HIPAA" medical record privacy laws applicable to certain providers in the substance abuse field. Those rules were generally enforced by the Department of Justice or HHS overall. However, now, OCR will enforce Part 2. Which actually kinda makes sense. I doubt there will be a lot of change in how things work, but its good to have all the healthcare privacy enforcement under consistent management.
Let's catch up on some recent HIPAA enforcement actions:
Deer Oaks, a HIPAA covered healthcare provider that provides behavioral health services primarily to residents in nursing homes and other facilities, misconfigured its IT systems to allow discharge summaries of 35 patients to be accessible online. A few months later, Deer Oaks suffered a ransomware attack that affected the PHI of 171871 patients. The hacker demanded a ransom payment, but it's not clear if Deer Oaks paid or not. Deer Oaks did report the incidents to OCR, and as part of its investigation, OCR determined that Deer Oaks didn't do an effective risk assessment (shocking, no?). Ultimately, in July 2025 OCR fined Deer Oaks $225,000 and implemented a 2-year monitored corrective action plan.
BayCare Health System in Florida reached a settlement with OCR in May 2025 regarding complaints about impermissible access to its electronic PHI. It seems a former staffer at a physician practice was able to get access to the BayCare medical record system, and sent a BayCare patient copies of her medical records (along with a video showing the hacker scrolling through her computerized records). OCR found that BayCare's policies and procedures weren't sufficient, and specifically that BayCare did not audit system activity sufficiently. In addition to 2 years of monitoring, BayCare was fined $800,000. At least OCR didn't point out a failure to conduct a risk assessment (although the monitoring plan specified the performance of a new risk assessment).
Also in May 2205, OCR settled a ransomware incident with Comstar, a Massachusetts ambulance billing and collection company. Business Associates must do risk assessments too, and Comstar didn't. When a hacker got into the system and encrypted the PHI of over 500,000 people, OCR determined that the lack of a risk assessment contributed to the incident. Two years of monitoring and $75,000 were the result. Risk analysis, policies and procedures, audit controls, system activity review, encryption and training all would help.
In July 2025, OCR settled another ransomware case, this time involving a Syracuse (NY) ambulatory eye surgery center. PYSA ransomware was used to encrypt the PHI of about 25,000 patients, and OCR determined that the ASC had never conducted a risk assessment. In addition to a $250,000 fine, the ASC will certainly be doing a risk assessment -- and other HIPAA activities during its 2-year monitoring plan.
Happy Memorial Day!
Sorry I've not posted in forever, and when I do it's few and far between, but it has been a very busy spring and when I've had time, I didn't think about the blog. But here's a compilation of stuff that's happened since the beginning of the year (and a few things from the end of last year):
Kettering Health (Ohio) Ransomware Event: Kettering Health, which operates 9 hospitals and a handful of other sites in and around Dayton, Ohio, has reported a ransomware event that happened May 20, preventing elective procedures. The hospitals' emergency rooms continued to be open.
It's unclear at this point whether data was lost to the hackers, but the hackers apparently claim they have and will release data unless their ransom demands are met.
Email As a Data Breach Vector: Almost 200 healthcare organizations suffered a cyberbreach involving their email systems over the last year. Phishing is probably the biggest type of incident, mainly those that allow hackers to gain credentials and thus establish email rules that allow for data theft and potentially insertion of ransomware.
Tightening systems helps, but even the best systems can be hacked if the users/gatekeepers simply let the hackers in or give them the keys.
Information-blocking news: EMR company must allow client's BAs to access PHI: I must admit I haven't been following this at all, but it's an interesting bit of news from the intersection of HIPAA privacy and 21st Century Cures Act interoperability. As you know, HIPAA tries to put the brakes on data sharing, while the Cures Act tries to increase data sharing. In this case, Real Time Medical, a health analytics company with a lot of nursing home clients, is suing Point Click Care, an EMR provider (that also provides other health data transmission services), to get access to those nursing homes' PHI. PCC is prohibiting RTM from accessing the data, even though the nursing homes are RTM's clients.
So far, the court has sided with RTM, calling PCC's actions data-blocking that's prohibited by the Cures Act.
I haven't dug into the case much, but from 30,000 feet, that sounds right -- if RTM is a business associate of the owner of the PHI, then the EMR company should NOT block that access.
PE-owned healthcare entities need to improve cybersecurity: I hate to say it, but at this point cybersecurity protections are more important than regular HIPAA blocking-and-tackling. And apparently, private equity backed healthcare companies are worse than others, which is in many ways surprising. Solid cybersecurity shouldn't be a heavy lift for nimble, tech-related companies, and most PE portfolios these days seem to be heavy into new tech. That should be a recipe for leading-edge cybersecurity, but apparently not.
Change Healthcare's Breach Victim Count Reaches 190,000,000. US population is about 340 million, which means the breach affected about 56% of the US population. So, if you're an American, it's more likely than not that your PHI was exposed in the Change breach.
A few months ago, a ransomware negotiator mentioned something to a client of mine that was a bit of a revelation. We were discussing the question of whether a breach victim can ever prove damages from a breach without some very specific evidence, such as the breach being a personal attack (an estranged spouse obtains the information and uses it in some obvious way to leverage a big divorce settlement payment) or the hacker deliberately using stolen data to blackmail a victim. If a covered entity suffers a breach and one of the victims of the breach suffers identity theft, can the victim prove that it was the breach in question that exposed his/her data, or might the data have been exposed in a different breach? The more breaches there are, the more difficult it will be for victims to prove causation.
The Change Healthcare breach might re-write the rules here: if I fail to protect your data and you get harmed, can you prove that my exposure of your data caused the harm, if your data was already exposed on the dark web?
Texas Health and Human Services Commission Suffers HIPAA Breach: If you haven't figured it out yet, anyone with health data is potentially susceptible to a data breach, and that includes governmental entities. The Texas Health and Human Services Commission, which oversees health and welfare programs in the state (including state Medicaid), reported recently that in November 2024, bad employees at the agency improperly accessed information of about 61,000 individuals. The employees have been fired and law enforcement authorities are investigating.
It is not clear if HHSC has reported the incident to OCR; it may be that the breach is not a HIPAA breach at all, but rather a breach of SNAP (i.e., food stamp) card information. That may make sense, if the bad employees were looking to skim funds off of the accounts of food stamp recipients (which, of course, changes "bad" to something much worse -- stealing from the poorest folks should get you a special circle of hell or something).
PHI Deletion Nets $337,750 Fine: This is a bit of an odd one: a Florida HIPAA business associate, USR Holdings, discovered that an unauthorized third party had access to its database for 3-4 months and deleted PHI of 2903 people. The normal problems were there: failure to conduct a risk assessment, no risk management plan, no system activity review, and no backups. The result was a $337,750 fine and a 2-year monitoring plan.
Here's the resolution agreement.
9th Ransomware Case: Virtual Private Network Solutions: HHS has entered into a settlement agreement with a HIPAA business associate who was hit with a ransomware attack in 2021 that resulted in the encryption of PHI. VPN Solutions provides data hosting and cloud services to HIPAA covered entities, and in October of 2021 was hit by a ransomware attack that resulted in encryption of data, including PHI of some covered entity clients. There does not appear to have been any exfiltration of data, and this it is unclear whether this incident is really a "breach" under HIPAA (it may be a violation due because it was a failure of "accessibility," but not a "breach"). However, VPN Solutions reported it. OCR's investigation discovered (surprise!) VPN Solutions had not done a sufficient risk assessment. VPM Solutions agreed to pay a $90,000 fine, implement a corrective action plan, and agree to one year of OCR monitoring.
Resolution agreement can be found here.
OCR's January 2025 "Dear Colleague" letter (slightly off-topic): As you know, the Office for Civil Rights is the HIPAA enforcement agency; but HIPAA is not all that OCR does, it also is responsible for enforcing anti-discrimination provisions of health-related laws and HHS rules, such as the notorious Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. And being a hyper-politicized department of still-current hyper-political executive administration (it seems to be in an internal competition with the Department of Education and the FTC to see who can be the most progressive/left-wing), it currently interprets those rules in a hyper-partisan fashion.
NOTE, importantly, this characterization does not apply to the HIPAA enforcement side of OCR, perhaps because HIPAA doesn't have the same capacity for partisan regulatory crusading as the general "civil rights" mandate of the rest of the office (although the partisanship does seep in where abortion is in play). So, I note that this comment is really OFF TOPIC for a HIPAA blog, but it's something that the healthcare industry needs to know about anyway.
On January 7, OCR issued a "Dear Colleague" letter outlining OCR's regulatory interpretation of how to apply Section 1557 and Section 405 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This is not a regulation; regulations require the ability of the public to comment and complain. But when the regulatory tell you this is what they think the law requires, you don't have to believe them or do what they say, but you damn well better be prepared to spend a lot of money defending yourself from the regulatory process they can put you through. "The process is the punishment."
The letter starts out by pointing out how doctors hate people with disabilities, because "large proportions of practicing physicians hold biased or stigmatized perceptions of people with disabilities, perceiving them to have a lower quality of life because of their disabilities." So you know where it's coming from.
It then goes on to address a handful of areas where potential discriminatory practices might come into play:
HHS Issues 8th Fine Related to Ransomware: Elgon Information Systems has agreed to an $80,000 settlement with OCR in relation to a ransomware event it suffered in March of 2023. It's the 8th overall ransomware settlement, and the 2nd under OCR's new "risk analysis initiative," which, like the focus on patient access, shows that OCR is selecting specific HIPAA problem areas on which to focus its investigation. While open firewall ports was the specific cause of the incident, that's just the sort of thing a good risk analysis would correct.
Lack of a good risk analysis, along with lack of sufficient policies and procedures, is the most common finding in OCR settlement agreements.
The resolution agreement is here.
Recent OCR Enforcement Actions: I've been pretty lazy on the blogging front lately, and let a bunch of items stack up, particularly noting the various enforcement actions of OCR. Now that it's end of year and I'm clearing out some old emails, let me post to a few.
First, OCR continues to make hay with relatively small fines against covered entities that fail to quickly and fully provide access to patients who ask for their PHI. Why do they fail or delay? Sometimes confusion, sometimes bad bureaucracy, but often it's because they want to punish a patient for failing to pay or finding another provider. Those are bad reasons, and if you do so, you should be punished. And why are the fines small? It's usually not a systemic problem (the way a breach shows that a covered entity has overall poor HIPAA hygiene), and it often also involves smaller covered entities who don't have the financial wherewithal to pay 6-figure settlements.
Other settlements involve the big issues: breaches, ransomware, overall HIPAA failures.
Anyway, here are some recent ones.
Biden Administration Proposes New Cybersecurity Requirements for Healthcare Organizations: Encryption and network compliance checks are included in the proposed revisions to the HIPAA Security Rule. The rule is presented as a fix to the current epidemic of healthcare data breaches. Expected cost to the industry: $15 billion over the first 5 years.
If this rule, which was published December 27 and is in its required 60-day comment period, survives the next Administration, I'll give you a better digest of what it contains.
Ascension breach affects 5.6 million: Ascension Health's May 2024 ransomware incident may have compromised PHI of 5.6 million people, according to the company's report to the Maine AG.
OCR and Abortion: If you're wondering if OCR is going to try to jump into enforcement actions of the soon-to-be-implemented (and likely soon-to-be-rescinded) reproductive health data rule, you should be aware that OCR has already fined a health system $35K for improperly disclosing a patient's reproductive health PHI. The patient authorized the release of a single test result to her employer, but the hospital mistakenly disclosed her whole record.
The Blinding, Amazing Stupidity of Xavier Becerra's HHS.
OK, there are plenty examples of this, but the one I'm wrestling with right now is so frustratingly idiotic, and an example of all the problems that happen when a governmental department is run as a virtue-signaling platitude operation rather than a serious governmental agency serving its constituents, the public. It is all the more frustrating that it comes while so many people are questioning the competence or credentials of Trump's cabinet selections, while ignoring the utter incompetence of Xavier Becerra.
I speak, of course, of the Biden Administration's so-called "HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy," which was published in final form on June 25, 2024. Let's be honest, this rule change is solely about one thing: the impotent, petulant cry of the pro-abortion lobby at the Supreme Court's decision in the Dobbs Case, which threw out the social experiment that was Roe v. Wade and returned the question of whether abortion should be legal or not to the legislatures of the various states or, if it chooses, Congress.
I don't care which way you come down on the abortion debate. There are intellectually (and societally) consistent rationales on both sides. But it is not a matter that 9 lawyers, not matter how smart, should decide for the other 330 million of us. It is a matter best dealt with by the democratic process. And I will fight you on that.
Back to the matter at hand. A little background:
Texas passed a law, the Texas Heartbeat Act, in 2021 (i.e., pre-Dobbs), which outlawed abortions once a fetal heartbeat is detectible. The statute has a peculiar provision: state officials are prohibited from enforcing it, but private citizens may do so. This prevented abortion-rights groups like Planned Parenthood from suing Texas state officials to have the law deemed unconstitutional under Roe (and Casey's "undue burden" test). (The Texas statute that was the subject of the Roe decision, which is effectively a total ban on abortions, was never repealed by the legislature, despite being declared unconstitutional by the Roe court; thus, it was still on the books to be "resuscitated" after Dobbs overturned Roe.)
The Heartbeat Act also prohibits anyone from "assisting" any post-heartbeat abortion; theoretically, this could mean that a private citizen could sue a company that offers to assist Texas woman who want to travel to another state to receive a post-heartbeat abortion, claiming that they are providing the assistance in Texas, where it is illegal. The Texas Attorney General in fact sent threatening letters to some large employers in the state in an effort to prevent them from offering abortion travel assistance as an employee benefit.
Rather than stay out of the fray, the Biden Administration jumped in with both left feet. This regulation would have single-handedly destroyed any basis for Chevron deference: if governmental agencies are capable of drafting something as stupid, incoherent, and unwieldy as the HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy, they should not only not get deference, those challenging the regulations should get the benefit of the doubt.
Basically, the new rule (i) prohibits uses and disclosures that could possibly be used to conduct any type of investigation into someone seeking, obtaining, or facilitating reproductive care (extremely broadly defined); (ii) requires covered entities to get an attestation prior to making any use or disclosure for health oversight, legal proceedings, law enforcement, or to coroners/medical examiners if the use or disclosure might touch on reproductive care (again, broadly defined), and (iii) requires specific reference in every Notice of Privacy Practices to specifically reference the prohibition in (i) and the attestation in (ii).
How bad is this? Let me count the ways:
Given the awful drafting of this Rule and the confusion regarding its meaning and effect, I can safely say that well over 95% of all healthcare providers will be arguably in violation this Rule as soon as it becomes effective
It does not require mentioning that the decision-makers at HHS will be gone 40 days from now. The likelihood that this bill will survive in the new administration is extremely low. And the Texas Attorney General filed suit in September, seeking to have enforcement of the rule enjoined, although the court has not acted yet.
But the stated effective date for all but the Notice of Privacy Practices provisions is December 23, 2024 (less than a month prior to Trump's upcoming inauguration). Given the lost election, do you think HHS would back off and delay enforcement until the new administration decides to keep it or junk it?
Hell no. HHS wants all entities subject to HIPAA to have to jump through all of these hoops unnecessarily. They want covered entities and business associates to require unnecessary attestations, draft unnecessary policies and procedures, and revise their Notices of Privacy Practices for no good reason.
Finally, I would note that, while noises have been made by the Texas Attorney General and others, I am unaware of anyone actually attempting to enforce the statute that triggered this Rule. Certainly, I am unaware of anyone anywhere trying to enforce the Heartbeat Act in a manner that this Rule would prevent. Thus, the cherry on top here, the chef's kiss, is this: this is a solution in search of a problem, a fix for a non-existent calamity. All of this is entirely unnecessary.Recent Ransomware settlement:
OK, I've sort of fallen down on the job here keeping the HIPAABlog updated, but I'm going to try to dump a bunch of items that I've been stacking up. So here goes.
In September, OCR settled with Cascade Eye and Skin Centers (WA) regarding Cascade's HIPAA failures that resulted in Cascade suffering a ransomware event that exposed 291,000 PHI-containing files (it is unclear how many individuals were affected). OCR cited 2 specific failures on Cascade's part: failure to conduct a proper risk analysis, and failure to have procedures in place to monitor system activity. Risk analysis is the linchpin of HIPAA security -- if you haven't done it, you don't even know if your security is good. And monitoring the activity on your information systems can give you an early warning that something is amiss.
The settlement agreement is here.
Providence Medical Institute Ransomware Fine: Providence Medical Institute has been fined $240,000 by OCR for HIPAA violations in connection with a ransomware attack that exposed the PHI of over 80,000 individuals. Interestingly, OCR only noted 2 HIPAA violations warranting the fine: lack of an appropriate BAA, and lack of policy restrictions on the people and programs who can access PHI. OCR did NOT note a lack of a sufficient risk assessment (but maybe that's implied since a good risk assessment would have noted the access problem and lack of BAAs?).